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Modern Military Necessity: The Role &
Relevance of Military Lawyers
Michael A. Newton*
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern warfare presents an array of legalistic overtones that
require the presence and participation of attorneys of exceptional
courage and breadth of expertise in demanding and austere
conditions. Military lawyers today must confront complex
missions and competing operational demands in representing the
needs of operational commanders. The legal dimension of conflict
has at times overshadowed the armed struggle between
adversaries as the nature of conflict itself has changed. The
overall mission will often be intertwined with political, legal, and
strategic imperatives that cannot accomplished in a legal vacuum
or by undermining the threads of legality that bind diverse
aspects of a complex operation together. The newly promulgated
United States doctrine for counterinsurgency operations makes
this clear in its opening section:I
Insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) are complex
subsets of warfare. Globalization, technological
* Acting Associate Clinical Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law
School. http://law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty/clinical-faculty/michael-a-
newton/index.aspx. This Article is dedicated to the spirit, dedication, and
determination of uniformed and civilian lawyers scattered across the face of
the globe who serve America's sons and daughters every day. Their sacrifices
and fidelity to the law in the midst of incredible demands are emblematic of
the very highest ideals of the legal profession as well as the profession of
arms.
1 DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL No. 3-24, MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING
PUBLICATION No. 3-33.5, COUNTERINSURGENCY 1-1 (DEC. 15 2006), available at
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/Repository/Materials/COIN-FM3-24.pdf.
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advancement, urbanization, and extremists who conduct
suicide attacks for their cause have certainly influenced
contemporary conflict; however, warfare in the 21st
century retains many of the characteristics it has
exhibited since ancient times. Warfare remains a violent
clash of interests between organized groups characterized
by the use of force. Achieving victory still depends on a
group's ability to mobilize support for its political
interests (often religiously or ethnically based) and to
generate enough violence to achieve political
consequences. Means to achieve these goals are not
limited to conventional forces employed by nation-states.
The United States doctrine for counterinsurgency refers to
legal considerations in numerous places as it describes the current
framework for accomplishing our strategic objectives. 2  In
contrast, writing some two decades after the Civil War, General
William Tecumseh Sherman sought to capture the key military
lessons of the war for posterity. In the midst of his astute
observations regarding, inter alia, the best composition of
regiments, the effects of good officership, and the support and
supply of great armies, he expressed a decidedly acerbic view of
the lawyers' role during operations. As the commander of a
disciplined fighting force, General Sherman's observation that
excessive "courts-martial in any command are evidence of poor
discipline and inefficient officers" rings as true today as it did in
1885. 3  The worldwide censure in the wake of Abu Ghraib
embodies the enduring truth of General Sherman's observation.
General Sherman conceded that "there are statutory offenses
which demand a general court-martial, and these must be ordered
by the division or corps commander," but followed this concession
with the strong caveat that "the presence of one of our regular
civilian-judge advocates in an army in the field would be a first
class nuisance, for technical courts always work mischief. '4
Though this sentiment might be ignored as the quaint
remnant of an archaic era when law was an afterthought and the
2. See id. at D-1.
3. WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN, MEMOIRS OF GENERAL W.T. SHERMAN
888 (The Library of America 1990) (1875).
4. Id.
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developed corpus of developed international law of war yet
glimmered on the horizon, those of us who have trained soldiers
know that its echoes remain in the sub-conscious attitudes of
many military members around the world. General Sherman
recognized the enduring truth that any good commander must
direct every operation towards a defined, decisive, and attainable
objective. The principle of "Objective" derives from the basic
principles of war recognized across the globe, and this principle is
refined for the purposes of military operations into the "mission
statement." 5 Even today, there is an undercurrent of opinion
amongst the rank and file that immediate operational or
situational dependent convenience can and should serve as a valid
excuse for deviating from established legal standards and innate
training. General Sherman's perception regarding the utility of
legal expertise, and its modern incarnation in pockets of military
personnel, reflects a shortsighted, superficial assessment that the
lawyers intermingled with a deployed force would distract from
5. The Principles of War crystallized as military doctrine around the
world around 1800. The accepted principles are: Objective, Offensive, Mass,
Economy of Forces, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, and
Simplicity. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY 557
(John Whiteclay Chambers II ed., 1999). In unilateral operations, the
mission statement reflects a relatively linear process of decision-making from
the civilian command authorities through military command channels to the
tactical force in the field. In multilateral operations, however, achieving
consensus on an agreed and refined mission statement is much more difficult
and complex. Reflecting this reality, U.S. Army doctrine warns that:
[clommanders must focus significant energy on ensuring that all
multinational operations are. directed toward clearly defined and
commonly understood objectives that contribute to the attainment of
the desired end state. No two nations share exactly the same reasons
for entering into a coalition or alliance. Furthermore, each nation's
motivation tends to change during the situation. National goals can
be harmonized with an agreed-upon strategy, but often the words
used in expressing goals and objectives intentionally gloss over
differences. Even in the best of circumstances, nations act according
to their own national interests. Differing goals, often unspoken,
cause each nation to measure progress differently. Thus,
participating nations must agree to clearly defined and mutually
attainable objectives.
DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-8, THE ARMY IN MULTINATIONAL
OPERATIONS 1-2 (Nov. 24, 1997), available at http://www.aschq.army.mil
/gc/files/FM100-8.pdf.
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the overall operational objectives.6
In truth, the success or failure of the mission provides the
yardstick for measuring the commander's success. Combat
readiness can thus be achieved only by melding individuals from
disparate backgrounds into a disciplined unit with a fine-edged
warrior ethos focused on overcoming any obstacle in order to
accomplish the mission. Even in light of the nonnegotiable
necessity for accomplishing the mission and the culture that
correspondingly prizes the selfless pursuit of duty, lawyers have a
vital role that supports rather than impedes the effort to create
and sustain combat ready forces.
This Article will address the range of responsibilities
incumbent on lawyers in the military and their necessity to the
functioning of the military. Though the phrase is most commonly
associated with the jus in bello principle that governs the conduct
of conflict, Part II addresses lawyers as a military necessity.
Military legal expertise provides an irreplaceable source of
guidance and insight to military commanders during times of
armed conflict. Part III addresses the law of lawyers regarding
the implementation of humanitarian law along with the military
lawyer's challenge in making legal aspects integral to the actions
of military commanders. In Part IV, the continued necessity of
military lawyers is discussed due to the military lawyer's ongoing
roles as trainers, negotiators, enforcers and reporters.
II. LAWYERS AS A MILITARY NECESSITY
Military commanders and their lawyers do not approach the
law of armed conflict as an esoteric intellectual exercise. The
necessity for military lawyers grew from the requirements of
commanders across the world for legal guidance. The
foundational principle of military necessity is at the core of the
lawful application of force in pursuit of the military mission, but it
cannot concurrently serve as a convenient rationale for any level
of unrestrained violence in the midst of an operation. 7 The law of
6. See SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 888.
7. See INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE FIELD (Government Printing Office 1898) (1863), reprinted in
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS,
RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 6, art. 16 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri
Toman eds., 1988) [hereinafter Lieber Code].
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armed conflict developed as a restraining and humanizing
necessity to facilitate commanders' ability to accomplish the
military mission even in the midst of fear, moral ambiguity, and
horrific scenes of violence.8 Far from the nuisance that General
Sherman postulated, commanders have relied on sound legal
advice precisely because of their need to accomplish the mission
rather than as an unfortunate impediment. Military lawyers and
good commanders develop a very special relationship of trust
precisely because the lawyer provides necessary technical advice
that the commander relies upon in solving some of the most
complex problems posed by the military mission itself. At the
time of this writing, an active duty military attorney is facing
court-martial for the first time in American military history for
his alleged failure to "ensure accurate reporting and a thorough
investigation into a possible, suspected, or alleged violation of the
law of war."9  If convicted, Captain Randy Stone's failure to
properly investigate allegations of war crimes would represent a
professional dereliction, but would be emblematic of a larger
failure to the commanders and soldiers who relied on his expertise
and professional perspective.
Even during General Sherman's war, the tactical uncertainty
faced by Union forces in waging a campaign against the rebel
forces thrust lawyers and the importance of sound legal analysis
into the spotlight. For example, the first comprehensive effort to
describe the law of war in a written code, the Lieber Code, began
as a request from the General-in-Chief of the Union Armies, based
on his confusion over the distinction between lawful and unlawful
combatants.1 0 General Henry Wager Halleck recognized that the
law of armed conflict never accorded combatant immunity to every
person who conducted hostilities, but could provide no pragmatic
command response to the changing tactics of war. I I He knew,
however, that the war could not be won without clear delineation
8. See THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF CONVENTIONS,
RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS vii (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman
eds., 1988).
9. http://www.usmc.millapa/Iraq/Haditha/Haditha-Preferred-Charges-
061221.htm
10. See RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 2
(1983) (Letter from General Halleck to Dr. Francis Lieber, Aug. 6, 1862).
11. See id.
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to the forces in the field regarding the proper targeting of
combatants and a correlative standard for the treatment of
persons captured on the battlefield based on the legal
characterization of their status. On August 6, 1862, General
Halleck wrote to Dr. Francis Lieber, a highly regarded law
professor at the then Columbia College in New York, to request
his assistance in defining guerrilla warfare. 12 This request, which
can justly be described as the catalyst that precipitated more than
one hundred years of legal effort resulting in the modern web of
international agreements regulating the conduct of hostilities,
read as follows:
My Dear Doctor: Having heard that you have given much
attention to the usages and customs of war as practiced in
the present age, and especially to the matter of guerrilla
war, I hope you may find it convenient to give to the
public your views on that subject. The rebel authorities
claim the right to send men, in the garb of peaceful
citizens, to waylay and attack our troops, to burn bridges
and houses and to destroy property and persons within
our lines. They demand that such persons be treated as
ordinary belligerents, and that when captured they have
extended to them the same rights as other prisoners of
war; they also threaten that if such persons be punished
as marauders and spies they will retaliate by executing
our prisoners of war in their possession. I particularly
request your views on these questions.13
Based on the stimulus of Confederate conduct, the Union
Army issued a disciplinary code governing the conduct of
hostilities, known worldwide as the Lieber Code, as "General
Orders 100 Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the
United States in the Field" in April 1863.14 General Orders 100
was the first comprehensive military code of discipline that sought
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Lieber Code, supra note 7, at 3. For descriptions of the process
leading to General Orders 100 and the legal effect it had on subsequent
efforts; see generally Grant R. Doty, The United States and the Development
of the Laws of Land Warfare, 156 MIL. L. REV. 224 (1998), and George B.
Davis, Doctor Francis Lieber's Instructions for the Government of Armies in
the Field, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 13 (1907).
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to define the precise parameters of permissible conduct during
conflict. 15 From this baseline, the principle endures in the law
today that persons who do not enjoy lawful combatant status are
not entitled to the benefits of legal protections derived from the
laws of war, including prisoner of war status, 16 and are subject to
punishment for their warlike acts. The law of war is therefore
integral to the very notion of military professionalism because it
defines the class of persons against whom professional military
forces can lawfully apply violence based on principles of military
necessity and reciprocity. 17
As an aside, Lieber's description of unlawful combatancy is
notable in light of the current legal context and the operational
debates that have played such a central role in the global war on
terror. Though this language is dated, it describes the tactics of Al
Qaeda in evocative terms:
Men, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, whether
by fighting, or inroads for destruction or plunder, or by
raids of any kind, without commission, without being part
and portion of the organized hostile army, and without
sharing continuously in the war, but who do so with
intermitting returns to their homes and avocations, or
with the occasional assumption of the semblance of
peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character
or appearance of soldiers-such men, or squads of men,
are not public enemies, and therefore, if captured, are not
entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, but shall be
15. Lieber Code, supra note 7, at 3.
16. This statement is true subject to the linguistic oddity introduced by
Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, which makes clear that the armed
forces of a state can include both combatants and non-combatants (meaning
chaplains and medical personnel), and that both classes of military personnel
are entitled to prisoner of war status if captured. See Annex to the
Convention Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
art. 3 1907 ("[t]he armed forces of the belligerent parties may consist of
combatants and non-combatants. In the case of capture by the enemy, both
have a right to be treated as prisoners of war"), entered into force Jan. 26,
1910, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 73 (Adam Roberts &
Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000)[hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations].
17. See generally LESLIE C. GREEN, What is - Why is There - The Law of
War?, in ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR 1 (2d. ed. 1999).
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treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates.18
In the modern era, the White House press spokesman took
pains to explain that the United States is treating all unlawful
combatants in its custody "humanely and, to the extent
appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner
consistent with the principles of the Third Geneva Convention of
1949." 19 Thus in its modern formulation, the linkage between
operational necessity and legality cannot be underemphasized. In
the context of the ongoing investigation and pending courts-
martial assessing the actions and attitudes of the Marines
involved in the Haditha incident, Major General Eldon Bargewell
recommended that his investigation be used to inform the
refinement and promulgation of Rules of Engagement (ROE) in
counterinsurgency operations "against an unscrupulous enemy
employing hit and run tactics designed to provoke indiscriminate,
disproportionate, or simply misdirected responses from coalition
forces. The lessons for staff procedures and reporting are basic,
but the case study will illustrate how simple failures can lead to
disastrous results. 2 °
Though the detailed prescriptions of the law of armed conflict
evolved in response to the demands of military pragmatism and
the impetus of changing technology, lawyers were also a necessary
ingredient in developing the norms that have come to define the
very essence of professionalism. Commanders must balance the
need to accomplish the mission against an internal awareness of
the larger legal and ethical context for their actions. As a
consequence, military professionals developed legal codes in order
to increase military efficiency by defining appropriate bounds to
facilitate the accomplishment of the mission. 21  Gustavus
Adolphus' Articles of War, for example, mandated that "no Colonel
18. Lieber Code, supra note 7, at 14, art. 82
19. The White House Fact Sheet, Status of Detainees at Guantanamo
(Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases
12002/02/20020207-13.html.
20. See http:www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/20/
AR2 007042002309.html (providing excerpts of the previously undisclosed
report which found no specific coverup but a command climate that tended to
minimize the casualties suffered by Iraqi civilians and the creation of
attitudes in which the death of noncombatants was accepted as "the price of
doing business.")
21. See HARTIGAN, supra note 10, at 3.
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or Captain shall command his soldiers to do any unlawful thing;
which so does, shall be punished according to the discretion of the
Judge."22 Any unit that is ripped apart by allegations of illegality
and indiscipline cannot be combat effective simply because its
members are focused on the details of sworn statements, self
preservation, and self interest rather than the overall
accomplishment of operational goals.2 3 Lawyers who are enforcing
the law through comprehensive investigations and appropriate
prosecutions will likely affect the unit's mission posture, but the
underlying indiscipline can be justly blamed for undercutting the
mission-first focus of a good, cohesive military organization. The
Marines based at Camp Pendleton are rediscovering this truism at
the time of this writing in the context of the courts-martial for
offenses charged in Haditha as well as a number of other
incidents.
Furthermore, as the backbone of military professionalism, the
implementation of legal norms in an operational setting became
an indispensable aspect of military legitimacy. International
humanitarian law is not a beast that is kept chained and fed with
words, conference, and good intentions. Quite the contrary,
though humanitarian law is grounded in the principles of
necessity, humanity, and reciprocity, those ideals are all achieved
in the context of facilitating the accomplishment of military
missions. 24 Those missions are, almost by definition, conducted in
the midst of fear, adrenaline, instinctive responses, and almost
instantaneous reaction to life threatening exigencies. The modern
law of armed conflict is really nothing more than a web of
interlocking protections and specific legal obligations held
together by the thread of respect for humankind and a reciprocal
expectation that other participants in armed conflict are bound by
the same normative constraints. 25 In short, the law serves as the
firebreak between being a hero in the service of your nation and a
22. GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, ARTICLES OF MILITARY LAWS TO BE OBSERVED IN
THE WARS (1621), quoted in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 59 (2d ed. 1999). The 150 Articles
regulating military conduct were a groundbreaking attempt to establish a
professional code grounded in legal formulations and were promulgated as
Swedish forces moved toward battle with Russian forces.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Doty, supra note 14, at 225.
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criminal who brings disgrace to your nation, dishonor to the unit,
and disruption to the military mission.
In the wake of the Lieber Code, other states issued similar
manuals: Prussia, 1870; The Netherlands, 1871; France, 1877;
Russia, 1877 and 1904; Serbia, 1878; Argentina, 1881; Great
Britain, 1883 and 1904; and Spain, 1893.26 Over time, military
codes and the more thorough military manuals that followed
served to communicate the "gravity and importance" of behavioral
norms to commanders and soldiers. 27 Legal norms continue to
form the rallying point of moral and professional clarity that
guides soldiers in the midst of incredibly nuanced missions,
regardless of fatigue or adrenaline in the impetus of the moment.
Indeed, the increased complexity of the law and the need to
ensure its effective implementation within the military structure
led to a specific obligation for the High Contracting to the 1907
Hague Regulations to "issue instructions to their armed land
forces . . . in conformity with the Regulations respecting the laws
and customs of war on land. '28 This incremental development
from the baseline of foundational principles prompted one of the
Nuremberg prosecutors to muse that "the law of war owes more to
Darwin than to Newton. '29 Because military lawyers played an
indispensable role in the effort to instill professional discipline by
defining the boundaries of acceptable conduct, they helped
safeguard the legitimacy of the military force in the eyes of the
nation and the ranks of military colleagues around the world.
III. THE LAW OF LAWYERS
As the law became more complex, and its implementation on
the battlefield more problematic, it is unsurprising and perhaps
inevitable that the role for lawyers became embedded in the law
itself. Over time, the laws of warfare have become the lodestone
of professionalism and the guiding point for professional military
26. Id. at 230.
27. W. Michael Reisman & William K. Lietzau, Moving International
Law from Theory to Practice: The Role of Military Manuals in Effectuating
the Laws of Armed Conflict, in THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, 64 NAVAL
WAR COL. INT'L. L. STUD., 1, 5-6 (Horace B. Robertson, Jr. ed., 1991).
28. 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 16, art. 1.
29. Thomas F. Lambert, Recalling the War Crimes Trials of World War
II, 149 MIL. L. REV. 15, 23 (1995).
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forces the world over. The law of armed conflict provides the
standards that separate trained professionals from a lawless
rabble. International humanitarian law balances its laudable
goals with the perfectly legitimate need to accomplish the mission.
The law explicitly embeds the latitude for military commanders
and lawyers to balance the requirements of the mission against
the humanitarian imperative of the law itself. Thus, legal duties
are predicated in many instances by such words as "to the fullest
extent practicable. '30 Among many other examples, legal duties
are described in terminology such as "unjustified act or
omission"31 or conditioned as follows: "unless circumstances do not
permit."32
The imperatives for balancing operational needs against the
mandates of the law are complicated by the growing
interconnection between previously discrete bodies of law. The
degree to which states are bound by their obligations flowing from
human rights law is "one of most controversial and politically
charged issues in current human rights discourse. '33 The lawyer
serves a vital purpose within the command by helping to ensure
that the obligations of the law are not seen as a hindrance, but as
an essential component of a professional military balancing the
legitimate use of power against the terror and pain that conflict
causes.34 The welter of legally intensive tasks accompanied by the
imperative for clear, concise, and understandable guidance that
can be understood and implemented by deployed forces is one of
the most pressing problems in modern military operations.
To that end, the International Court of Justice noted in the
Nuclear Weapons case that the law of war is lex specialis that
takes precedence over some otherwise applicable legal norms in
the context of armed conflict. 35 The lex specialis principle helps to
30. 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims Of International Armed
Conflicts, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 23, art. 10(2) [hereinafter Protocol
I].
31. Id. at art. 11.
32. Id. at art. 57(2)(c).
33. John Cerone, Human Dignity in the Line of Fire: The Application of
International Human Rights Law During Armed Conflict, Occupation, and
Peace Operations, 39 VAND. J. TRANS'L L. 1447 (2006).
34. Id.
35. See Michael J. Matheson, The Opinion of the International Court of
20071
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clarify the most appropriate source for deriving legal norms and
interpreting otherwise unclear application of binding norms.
Numerous domestic courts have accordingly rejected claims of
combatant immunity that are unwarranted under existing
international law. 36  On the other hand, there are some
international law scholars who would argue that lawyers
interpreting and applying the treaties governing the conduct of
hostilities must extrapolate from the text to fashion legal advice
that focuses on the "higher purposes which are the raison d'etre of
the convention. '37
The corollary to the lex specialis principle is that a cadre of
specialists in the details and nuances of the legal fabric are as
necessary to the lawful conduct of hostilities as the forces and
equipment. These principles form the practical foundation which
warrants the textual mandate of Protocol I, Article 82:
The High Contracting Parties at all times, and the
Parties to the conflict in time of armed conflict, shall
ensure that legal advisors are available, when necessary,
to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on
Justice on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 91 AM. J. INT'L. L. 417, 422
(1997) ("[T]he test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, falls to
be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in
armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.").
36. See, e.g., The Military Prosecutor v. Omar Mahmud Kassem and
Others, Israeli Military Court, Ramallah, April 13, 1969, 41 I.L.R. 470 (1971),
reprinted in HOWARD LEVIE, DOCUMENTS ON PRISONERS OF WAR, 60 NAVAL WAR
COL. INT. L. STUD. 771 (1979) (rejecting the claim of combatant immunity
raised by a member of the "Organization of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine"); House of Lords (Privy Council), Osman Bin Haji
Mohamed Ali and Another Appellant and the Public Prosecutor Respondent
On Appeal From the Federal Court of Malaysia, 1 Law Rep. 430 (1969),
reprinted in MARCO SASSOLI & ANTOINE BOUVIER, How DOES LAW PROTECT IN
WAR? 767 (International Committee of the Red Cross 1999) (rejecting
combatant status for members of the Indonesian armed forces who failed to
comply with the provisions of Article 4 of the Geneva Conventions).
37. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1951, p. 23, available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pl=3&p2=4&k=90&case=12&code
=ppcg&p3=4 ("The objects of such a convention must also be considered. The
Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing
purpose. It is indeed difficult to imagine a convention that might have this
dual character to a greater degree, since its object on the one hand is to
safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and on the other to
confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of morality.
MODERN MILITARY NECESSITY
the application of the Conventions and this Protocol and
on the appropriate instruction to be given the armed
forces on this subject.38
For those states party to the Protocol, Article 82 imposes an
affirmative obligation to provide legal advisors to military forces. 39
A number of nations have relegated such functions to officials
within the Ministries of Defense. However, as a logical extension
of the commander's authority for promulgating and enforcing
uniform rules of discipline and professionalism across the force,
the concept of legal advisor for military forces should be largely
synonymous with the concept of military lawyer. Who better to
understand and represent both professional military obligations
with the requirements of the law than a professional soldier?
The professionalism of the military lawyer is also an
extremely important component in gaining the credibility and
respect of both commanders and soldiers that is necessary to
properly implement the constraints of the law.40 One eminent
commentator referred to the soldier/lawyer who is equipped to fill
such a vital operational niche as the "lawyer-in-uniform."'41 The
combination of legal, diplomatic, military, and personal skills
needed to serve these ends makes the modern military lawyer a
distinctive servant of the nation. Within Article 82, the caveat
"when necessary" does permit flexibility and sovereign choices in
the conditions for the use, allocation, and location within the
military structure of those legal advisors.42 The unstated but
necessary corollary to this legal duty is that the Parties to the
Protocol have an obligation to ensure that the selected legal
advisors "get the appropriate training."43 In addition, the creation
of an office or section exclusively devoted to international law
applicable in armed conflict is an "apparently essential
prerequisite for the implementation of Article 82.''44
38. Protocol I, supra note 30, art. 82.
39. Id.
40. GEOFFREY BEST, WAR & LAW SINCE 1945, at 406 (1994).
41. Id.
42. Protocol I, supra note 30, at art. 82.
43. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 949 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds.,
1987) [hereinafter ICRC Commentary on Protocol I] .
44. Id. at 952.
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The Additional Protocol expanded on earlier provisions of the
law with regard to concrete obligations for its training and
dissemination. 45 Article 83 included more sweeping provisions
focused on closing the gap between the textual provisions of law
and their realization in practice:
1. The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of
peace as in time of armed conflict, to disseminate the
Conventions and this Protocol as widely as possible in
their respective countries and, in particular, to include
the study thereof in their programmes of military
instruction and to encourage the study thereof by the
civilian population, so that those instruments may
become known to the armed forces and to the civilian
population.
2. Any military or civilian authorities who, in time of
armed conflict, assume responsibilities in respect of the
application of the Conventions and this Protocol shall be
fully acquainted with the text thereof.46
Taken together, these provisions are intended to affect a
comprehensive mechanism for training military professionals in
the obligations inherent in the law of armed conflict as well as a
systematic and authoritative implementation of those principles.
45. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 6 U.S.T. 3114, art. 47 (replacing previous
Geneva Wounded and Sick Conventions of 22 August 1864, 6 July 1906, and
27 July 1929 by virtue of Article 59); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 6 U.S.T.
3217, art. 48 (replacing Hague Convention No. X of 18 October 1907, 36 Stat.
2371); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3316, art. 127
(replacing the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Prisoners of
War of 27 July 1929, 47 Stat. 2021); Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilians in Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3516, art. 144.
46. Protocol I, supra note 30, at art. 83.
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IV. BACK TO THE FUTURE: THE CONTINUED NECESSITY FOR MILITARY
LAWYERS
A. The Lawyer as Trainer
Recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan serve as a stark
reminder that the efforts of commanders and lawyers to achieve a
well-trained and disciplined force can never be taken for granted.
Unfortunately, this is not a new lesson. Lieutenant General
William R. Peers reported that one of the contributing factors to
the crimes committed at My Lai was that "[n]either units nor
individual members of Task Forcer Barker and the 11th Brigade
received the proper training in the Law of War (Hague and
Geneva conventions), the safeguarding of noncombatants, or the
Rules of Engagement. '47  Proper training in the legal
requirements that inhere in the conduct of hostilities and the
interactions of military with non-combatants should be seen
merely as a necessary foundational step for the accomplishment of
those obligations. Thus, United States military doctrine requires
that military lawyers are always available to assist commanders
in applying international humanitarian law "at all appropriate
levels of command and during all stages of operational planning
and execution of joint and combined operations."48
In order to actualize this commitment to implementing legal
obligations, U.S. military doctrine further specifies that advice on
law of war compliance should address not only legal constraints on
operations but also legal rights to employ force. 49 This formal
doctrine is entirely appropriate in light of the need for lawyers to
successfully facilitate the transfer of the intellectual knowledge
gained in the classroom into the reality of the military operation.
In practice, the lawyer must have a hand in the drafting, training,
dissemination, inspection, and enforcement of the Rules of
Engagement and command policies that provide the linkage from
the classroom to the field. 50 This, in turn, requires that lawyers
47. WILLIAM R. PEERS, THE MY LAI INQUIRY 230 (1979).
48. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEMORANDUM, MJCS 5810.01B, SUBJECT:
IMPLEMENTATION OF DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM, para. 4b. (Mar. 25, 2002),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs-directives/cdata/unlimit/5810_Ol.pdf.
49. See generally id.
50. Id. at Enclosure A. para 3e. The Bargewell report into the Haditha
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work closely with commanders and staffs to ensure proper
targeting in the deliberate process. The Rules of Engagement
must be disseminated to every corner of the command; equally
important, the lawyer must be constantly on the move to reinforce
the legal component of the Rules of Engagement, answer
questions, and fill the gaps in soldiers' minds regarding the
interface of law and tactics. 51
Some soldiers from the Vietnam. era reported that a
lackadaisical approach to legal training caused them to take the
otherwise sound command guidance they received on pocket cards
and put the cards into their pockets unread and hence ignored. 52
The United States Army continues to develop and disseminate
such cards, as do many of our allies. The card is not an end in
itself, but serves as the commander's tool to help instill
compliance with legal norms, which is in turn reinforced by the
active role of military lawyers. 53 In the modern era, successful
operations require that young warriors at all levels are educated
and empowered to make important and accurate decisions since
their actions often have strategic consequences. United States
counterinsurgency doctrine specifies that:
Senior leaders set the proper direction and climate with
thorough training and clear guidance; then they trust their
subordinates to do the right thing. Preparation for tactical-level
leaders requires more than just mastering Service doctrine; they
must also be trained and educated to adapt to their local
situations, understand the legal and ethical implications of their
actions, and exercise initiative and sound judgment in accordance
with their senior commanders' intent. 54
Incident noted, inter alia, that the Rules of Engagement in place for the
deployed Marine unit did not prevent a unit climate in which "Iraqi civilian
lives are not as important as U.S. lives, their deaths are just the cost of doing
business, and that the Marines need to get 'the job done' no matter what it
takes." See http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04
/20/AR2007042002309.html
51. Id. at Enclosure A, para 3g; see also ICRC Commentary on Protocol I,
supra note 43, at 953.
52. PEERS, supra note 47, at 230.
53. See generally JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEMORANDUM, MJCS 5810.01B,
SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM, para. 4b. (March
25, 2002), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs-directives/cdata
/unlimit/5810_01.pdf.
54. COUNTERINSURGENCY, supra note 1, Para 1-157.
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In contrast to simply preparing a card for distribution to
soldiers, lawyers with the Third Infantry Division during
Operation Iraqi Freedom developed a matrix that was
disseminated and used at command levels down to the smallest
tactical force. The matrix (see Figure 1 below) gave commanders
and soldiers a quick and ready reference with which to consider
and implement the obligations of international humanitarian law.
Lawyers had inculcated commanders and soldiers with the
concepts drawn from the laws and customs of war and notably
were required to sign the form along with the relevant
commanders. Anecdotal evidence shows that the Third Infantry
Division filled out these cards and kept records of their efforts to
comply with the law as long as it was physically possible given the
demands of the battle.
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Commanders are responsible for assessing proportionality before authorizing indirect
fire into a populated area or protected place (NFAIRFA). Refer to ROE; seek legal
advice; copy SJA, G5 and FSE.
POPULATED AREA TARGETING RECORD
(Military Necessity - Collateral Damage - Proportionality Assessment)
I. MILITARY NECESSITY - What are we shooting at and why?
1. DTG of mission:
2. Location - Grid Coordinates:
3. Enemy Target (WMD, CHEM, SCUD, ARTY, ARMOR, C2, LOG)
a. Type and Unit:
b. Importance to Mission:
4. Target Intel:
a. How Observed: UAV, FIST, SOF, other:
b. Unobserved: Q36, Q37, ELINT, other:
c. Last Known DTG of Observation or Detection:
5. Other Concerns as applicable:
a. US Casualties: Number: Location:
b. Receiving Enemy Fire: Unit: Location
II. COLLATERAL DAMAGE - Who or what is there now?
6. City: Original Population:
7. Estimated Population Now in Target Area (if known):
8. Cultural, Economic, or Other Significance and Effects:
III. MUNITIONS SELECTION - Mitigate civilian casualties and civilian property
destruction
9. Available Delivery Systems Within Range:
155, MLRS, ATACMS, AH64, CAS, other:
10. Munitions: DPICM, Precision-Guided Munitions (PGM),
other:
IV. COMMANDER'S AUTHORIZATION TO FIRE - Proportionality analysis
11. Legal Advisor's Rank and Name:
12. Civil Affairs/G5 Advisor:
13.Is the anticipated loss of life and damage to civilian property acceptable in relation to
the military advantage expected to be gained? Yes/No
14. Commander or Representative's Rank, Name, and Position:
15.Optional Comments:
16. DTG of Decision:
17. TARGET NUMBER:
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B. The Lawyer as Negotiator
Military lawyers must continue to play a central role in the
negotiation of new legal norms. The Official ICRC Commentary
on Protocol I notes with significant understatement, "a good
military legal advisor should have some knowledge of military
problems. '57 In a similar vein, the law cannot be allowed to drift
into an atrophied state in which its objectives are seen as
romanticized and unattainable in the operational context. If
humanitarian law becomes separated from the everyday
experience and practice of professional military forces around the
world, it is in danger of being relegated to the remote pursuit of
ethereal goals. As the Third Infantry Division matrix illustrates
so well, the law takes form and shape in the practice of soldiers
and the thinking of commanders on the ground rather than in the
textbooks and scholarly opinions.
Military lawyers need to be involved in the negotiation and
discussion of emerging legal norms precisely because it is so vital
to maintain ownership in the field of humanitarian law.
Continued ownership of the legal regime by military professionals,
in turn, sustains the core professional identity system of military
forces. 58 Failure to keep the legal norms anchored in the real
world of practice would create a great risk of superimposing the
humanitarian goals of the law as the dominant and perhaps only
legitimate objective in times of conflict.59 This trend could result
57. ICRC Commentary on Protocol I, supra note 43, at 951 3347.
58. See generally JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEMORANDUM, MJCS 5810.01B,
SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM, para. 4b. (Mar. 25,
2002), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs-directives/cdata/unlimit
/5810_01.pdf.
59. The International Court of Justice (in dicta and in an Advisory
Opinion) has hinted at precisely such an evolutionary approach that would
quite possibly erode the clear text of a treaty in favor of subsequent
humanitarian and societal developments (emphasis added). Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971, para. 53, available at http://www.icj-
cij .org/docket/files/53/5595.pdf
53. All these considerations are germane to the Court's evaluation of
the present case. Mindful as it is of the primary necessity of
interpreting an instrument in accordance with the intentions of the
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in principles and documents that would become increasingly
divorced from military practice and, therefore, increasingly
irrelevant to the actual conduct of operations.
For example, Article 23 of the 1899 Hague II Convention
stated that it was forbidden "[t]o destroy or seize the enemy's
property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war. '61  This same language
showed up in Article 8(2)(b)(xiii) and 8(2)(e)(xii) of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court.6 2 Some civilian
delegates sought to introduce a totally subjective threshold by
which to second-guess military operations based on their belief
that the concept of military necessity ought to be an unacceptable
component of military decision-making. In addition, they
proposed a verbal formula for the Elements that any seizure of
civilian property would be valid only if based on imperative
military necessity. 63 Such an element would have been contrary to
the entire history of armed conflict law. The concept of military
necessity is ingrained into the law of armed conflict already;
introducing such a gradation would have built a doubly high wall
parties at the time of its conclusion, the Court is bound to take into
account the fact that the concepts embodied in Article 22 of the
Covenant-"the strenuous conditions of the modern world" and "the
well-being and development" of the peoples concerned-were not
static, but were by definition evolutionary, as also, therefore, was the
concept of the "sacred trust." The parties to the Covenant must
consequently be deemed to have accepted them as such. That is why,
viewing the institutions of 1919, the Court must take into
consideration the changes which have occurred in the supervening
half-century, and its interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the
subsequent development of law, through the Charter of the United
Nations and by way of customary law. Moreover, an international
instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework
of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the
interpretation.
61. Convention (II) with Respect to Laws and Customs of War on Land
and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land
art 23, The Hague, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1899 U.S.T. LEXIS 31.
62. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, art.
8(2)(b).
63. KNUT DORMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 249 (2002).
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having a paralyzing effect on military action that would have been
perfectly permissible under existing law prior to the 1998 Rome
Statute. 64  Moreover, a double threshold for the established
concept of military necessity would have clouded the decision-
making of commanders and soldiers who must balance the
legitimate need to accomplish the mission against the mandates of
the law.65
Of course, any responsible commander and lawyer recognizes
that because the corpus of humanitarian law enshrines the
principle of military necessity in appropriate areas, the rules
governing the conduct of hostilities cannot be violated based on an
ad hoc rationalization of a perpetrator who argues military
necessity where the law does not permit it. Such a subjective and
unworkable formulation would have exposed military commanders
to after the fact personal criminal liability for their good faith
judgments based only on a after-the fact subjective assessments.
The ultimate formulation translated the 1899 phrase into the
simple modern formulation "military necessity" that every
commander and military attorney understands. 66 The military
lawyers among the delegates were among the most vocal in
defeating the suggestion to change the law precisely because the
elements for such a crime would have been unworkable in
practice. 6 7 The military officers participating in the Elements
discussions were focused on maintaining the law of armed conflict
as a functional body of law practicable in the field by well-
intentioned and well-trained forces.68 The importance of this role
will not diminish in the foreseeable future.
C. The Lawyer as Enforcer
The importance of enforcing the substantive body of norms
through criminal investigations and prosecutions when
64. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, art.
8(2)(b).
65. See DORMANN, supra note 63, at 249-50.
66. Id.
67. See Michael A. Newton, The International Criminal Court
Preparatory Commission: The Way It Is & The Way Ahead, 41 VA. J. INT'L L.
204, 211-12 (2000).
68. Id.; See also Kenneth Anderson, The Role of the United States
Military Lawyer in Projecting a Vision of the Laws of War, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L.
445, 454 (2003).
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appropriate cannot be overstated. As early as 1842, Secretary of
State Daniel Webster articulated the idea that a nation's
sovereignty also entails "the strict and faithful observance of all
those principles, laws, and usages which have obtained currency
among civilized states, and which have for their object the
mitigation of the miseries of war. '6 9  The enforcement of
humanitarian norms and the creation of post-conflict justice
mechanisms within the broader civilian society are an
increasingly common operational component. 70 Military lawyers
are at the forefront of such efforts precisely because they are in
the best position to evaluate the culpability of commanders in
light of the "reasonable commander" standard that is built into the
law of armed conflict. 71 Moreover, the same experts who advise
commanders on the proper implementation of the law should find
a great deal of professional satisfaction in helping to ensure that
the law retains its influence and credibility. Their expertise forms
the basis of effective prosecutions that are legally sound, but fair
and credible from the perspective of soldiers in the field.
The events at Abu Ghraib have served to remind military
professionals of the visceral linkage between their actions and the
achievement of the mission. At the time of this writing, there
have been some 330 credible accounts of detainee mistreatment,
69. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, 1 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-6 (1906).
70. See generally Michael A. Newton, Harmony or Hegemony? The
American Military Role in the Pursuit of Justice, 19 CONN. J. INT'L LAw 231
(2004).
71. The ICTY Report concluded that criminal investigations were not
warranted by the actions of NATO during the bombing campaign during
which only an estimated 500 civilian deaths resulted from 38,400 sorties that
released 23,614 air munitions. See International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee
Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign, paras. 53-54, reprinted
in 39 I.L.M. 1257, 1272 (2000) available at
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/natoO613OO.htm; see also id. at para. 50
("The answers to these questions are not simple. It may be necessary to
resolve them on a case by case basis, and the answers may differ depending
on the background and values of the decision maker. It is unlikely that a
human rights lawyer and an experienced combat commander would assign
the same relative values to military advantage and to injury to
noncombatants. Further, it is unlikely that military commanders with
different doctrinal backgrounds and differing degrees of combat experience or
national military histories would always agree in close cases. It is suggested
that the determination of relative values must be that of the 'reasonable
military commander.').
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and of the 600 or so personnel implicated in subsequent
investigations, there are more than 40 serving custodial
sentences. 72 The military lawyer plays a critical role in developing
criminal cases and making recommendations for the appropriate
disposition of cases in light of the evidence and the wide range of
disciplinary tools available to the commanders. 73 Abu Ghraib
represents a sharp departure from American ideals precisely
because some soldiers forgot about their overarching mission to
defend justice and human dignity. At the same time, it is worth
recalling that the crimes were made public because one young
soldier, Specialist Joseph Darby, alerted appropriate authorities
when he became aware of the activities inside Abu Ghraib. 74 The
investigation and administration of appropriate discipline against
culpable individuals serves an important deterrent purpose in the
legal regime by helping to strengthen the resolve of the next
Joseph Darby who may be forced to choose between loyalty to his
comrade-in-arms and the principles of law and professionalism.
Legal advisors play another, more subtle, role in successful
enforcement of the law of armed conflict. In one case from Iraq,
an officer of the 101st Airborne Division was prosecuted for lying
about the conduct of his soldiers after they stole a vehicle from an
Iraqi man.75 Testimony at trial showed that although the soldiers
had a right to take the vehicle based on military necessity,76 they
failed to provide a receipt as mandated by the Division policy that
was crafted to comply with the law.77 The legal advisor had
trained the unit on the appropriate legal procedures, but had also
ensured that the receipts needed to comply with the law were
72. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights First, and NYU Center for
Human Rights and Global Justice, By the Numbers: Findings of the Detainee
Abuse and Accountability Project at 6 (Apr. 2006), available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2006/ctO4O6/ ct04O6webwcover.pdf (last visited Apr. 5,
2007).
73. See Rear Admiral Michael F. Lohr & Commander Steve Gallotta,
Legal Support in War: The Role of Military Lawyers, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 465,
468-69 (2003).
74. See Seymour Hersh, The Gray Zone, NEW YORKER, May 24, 2004, at
80.
75. See Army Jury Recommends 1-Month Sentence, Also Recommends
Dismissal for Lying in Iraq SUV Case, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Aug. 14,
2004, at B4, available at 2004 WLNR 19124585 [hereinafter Army Jury].
76. See 1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 16, art. 23(g).
77. See Army Jury, supra note 75.
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printed and distributed. 78  It is only appropriate that those
soldiers who knowingly disregarded their professional and legal
obligations be prosecuted by the same attorney who had gone to
such lengths to train and equip them for compliance. Similarly,
many of the prosecutions of those who strayed so far from
accepted professional norms in Iraq are based on the principle of
dereliction of duty. Reflecting a concept of military law recognized
around the world, Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice makes it a crime to fail to perform a known duty, either
willfully or through neglect.79 The necessary base of knowledge
that supports subsequent enforcement efforts was built by the
military lawyers who taught the units, rehearsed them, and
integrated legal considerations into the operational flow as well as
the Rules of Engagement.
D. The Lawyer as Reporter
Lawyers who advise commanders on the proper application of
humanitarian law have a vested interest in helping to ensure that
those norms are respected and implemented in the future. In
order to achieve that fundamental objective, legal advisors must
be engaged at all levels to bring the light of truth and proper legal
analysis to allegations of war crimes.8 0 Humanitarian law belongs
to the armed forces of the world; it is not a media tool to be
manipulated and sensationalized. The passivity of trained
lawyers in the face of misleading media reports could permit
humanitarian law to be seen as nothing more than a mass of
indeterminate subjectivity that can be used as another weapon in
the moral domain of conflict at the behest of the side with the best
cameras, biggest microphones, and most compliant accomplices in
the media.
Lawyers must be proactive in responding to allegations that
humanitarian norms have been violated by collecting the relevant
facts and eyewitness accounts, then analyzing them in light of
their particular expertise in the law. There is a very real danger
that the media can be manipulated and used to mask genuine
violations of the law with spurious allegations and
78. Id.
79. 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2000).
80. See Lohr & Gallotta, supra note 73, at 471.
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misrepresentations of the actual state of the law. Failure to
articulate the correct state of the law in turn feeds into an
undercurrent of suspicion and politicization that could erode the
very foundations of humanitarian law. This in turn can lead to a
cycle of cynicism and second guessing that could weaken the
commitment of some military forces to actually follow the law.
For example, no responsible commander intentionally targets
civilian populations, and the law on this matter is clear and
fundamental.8 ' In the era of mass communications, the media
often creates a perception that the normative content of the law is
meaningless by conveying an automatic presumption that any
instance of collateral damage is based on illegal conduct by
military commanders. This perception is, of course, completely
without foundation in humanitarian law. Left unchecked by the
law and the facts, however, it can erode the acceptance of the law
in the minds of military professionals who may begin to feel that
their good faith efforts to comply with the complex provisions of
the law are meaningless and counterproductive in terms of
gaining legitimacy and public trust. Indeed, nothing would erode
compliance with humanitarian law faster than false reports of
what the other side has done, or distorted allegations that
permissible conduct in fact represents willful defiance of
international norms.
Secondly, lawyers should never accept a moral or legal
equivalence between an enemy that deliberately and repeatedly
violates the basic norms of international law because a
professional military is required to comply with the principles of
the law of war at all times.8 2 Accurate and timely documentation
of illegal conduct on the part of non-state actors may represent the
most effective way to enforce the law on a reciprocal basis.
Professional soldiers are often confronted with circumstances in
which the enemy forces disregard applicable legal principles by
deliberately endangering civilians and waging war with no regard
81. Protocol I, supra note 30, at art. 48.
82. See, e.g., DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 2311.01E, DOD LAW OF WAR
PROGRAM, para. 4.1 (May 9, 2006) [hereinafter DOD. Dir. 2311.01E]
(requiring that United States Armed Forces "shall comply with the law of
war in the conduct of military operations and related activities in armed
conflict, however such conflicts are characterized"), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231101p.pdf.
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for the norms of humanity. In contrast, American soldiers in Iraq
have risked their lives on many occasions and constrained
themselves because of their own professional obligations and
discipline even when it complicates their missions or made the
loss of American lives more likely.
Professional soldiers who are guided by the norms of
humanitarian law are immediately concerned with ameliorating
the suffering of the civilian population and providing assistance
for the innocent victims of conflict when they are caught in the
vortex of combat, unlike those who exult in the intentional murder
of unarmed civilians. The kindness of individual American
soldiers towards those civilians unfortunate enough to be caught
in the vortex of combat has been one of the truest measures of
their training and humanity. If the exposure of illegal acts on the
part of the adversary helps sway social and political opinion away
from supporting lawless thugs, they may in turn recognize that
their unlawful actions are a barrier to achieving their ends. Some
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOS) and Intergovernmental
Organizations (IGOS) have been able to use media outlets as an
effective tool for buttressing humanitarian norms.8 3 The legal
advisor plays a critical role in getting to the scene quickly at the
behest of the commander and ensuring that the facts are accurate
so that the legal analysis is correct and timely.
V. CONCLUSION
Lawyers who serve the interests of the law as honest brokers
have a critical role in implementing humanitarian law. The law of
armed conflict emerged as the benchmark for military
professionalism because its precepts restrain the application of
raw power and bloodlust even in the midst of chaos, mind-
numbing fear, and overwhelming uncertainty. The law of war is
integral to the very notion of professionalism because it defines
the class of persons against whom professional military forces can
lawfully apply violence based on principles of military necessity
and reciprocity.8 4 The current context of the global war on terror
83. See John King Gamble et al., Human-Centric International Law: A
Model and a Search for Empirical Indicators, 14 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 61,
64 (2005).
84. See generally LESLIE C. GREEN, What is - Why is There - The Law of
War, in ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR 1 (2d. ed. 1999).
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has confronted military commanders with the challenge of
implementing humanitarian restraints in an environment marked
by the utter disregard for the bounds of international law on the
part of the adversary. The two essential strands that professional
military forces must reexamine and apply in this new style of
conflict are: How may we properly apply military force? If lawful
means of conducting conflict are available, against whom may we
properly apply military force? These two strands are the essential
foundation of the professional military ethos, even against a
lawless enemy.
Despite their own obligations to comply with the "law of war
during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are
characterized," 85 the global war on terror has confronted
American soldiers with an adversary that intentionally targets
civilians and participates in armed conflict without legal authority
to do so. Nevertheless, if the law is to fulfill its intended purpose
as the normative benchmark, military commanders and lawyers
must implement it in good faith. The only guarantee is that the
task is difficult and the progress slow, but their role is nonetheless
essential. The creator of the Hague Peace Conference, Czar
Nicholas cautioned that "[o]ne must wait longer when planting an
oak than when planting a flower. '8 6 The balance between the
mandates of the mission and the obligations of the law make the
services of the lawyer an operational necessity.
85. See, e.g., DOD. Dir. 2311.01E, para. 4.1, supra note 81.
86. JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF
1899 AND 1907 xiv (1915).
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